SECOND DIVISION
PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., G.R.
No. 142641
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-
v e r s u s
- CORONA,
AZCUNA
and
GARCIA, JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July
17, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari assails the April 28, 1999 decision[1]
and March 27, 2000 resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the trial court’s
judgment finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise
known as the “Bouncing Checks Law.”
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from
private complainant Josefino Cenizal
[] in the amount of P100,000.00. Several weeks
thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal].
[Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of
the Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizal’s house
located at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon
City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not
deposit the check immediately because [petitioner] promised [] that he would
replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times.
When his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the check
to the bank for encashment. The head office of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed [Cenizal]
that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
Thereafter,
[Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform
him of the dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found
out that [petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal]
referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three
days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. [Petitioner] still
failed to make good the amount of the check. As a consequence, [Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 before the office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and
submitted documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa
and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner].
After due investigation, this case for [v]iolation of
[BP 22] was filed against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The check in question
and the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as
a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss
of the check in question and the return slip.[3]
After
trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the
Court of Appeals. However, on April 28, 1999, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s decision in toto. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner
claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the
failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial. He
also contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor of the check
because it was presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law.
Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice requirement was
not complied with and he was given only three days to pay, not five banking
days as required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts that he had already paid
his obligation to Cenizal.
Petitioner’s contentions have no merit.
Significance of the 90-day Period
For Presentment
of the Check
Petitioner
asserts that there was no violation of BP 22 because the check was presented to
the drawee bank only on December 5, 1991 or 120 days
from the date thereof (August 4, 1991). He argues that this was beyond the
90-day period provided under the law in connection with the presentment of the
check. We disagree.
Section
1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds.
― Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account
or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The
same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit
to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank.
Where
the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act.
In
Wong v. Court of Appeals,[4]
the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of
the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain
sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated
in the check. According to current
banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes
stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the
loss caused by the delay.
Thus,
Cenizal’s presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was
still within the allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither from the
obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from liability resulting
from the dishonor of the check.
Applicability of the
Best Evidence Rule
Petitioner’s insistence on the
presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for
conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130,
Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule.
However, the rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject
of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document
or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.[5]
The
gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and
issuing a worthless check.[6]
Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the
check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence
of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal
testified that he presented the originals of the check, the return slip and
other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during
the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie
case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding
information based on the documents. Although the check and the return slip were
among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that
occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to
adequately establish the due execution, existence and loss of the check and the
return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the
trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admited that
he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented for
payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Presence of the
Elements of the Offense
Based
on the allegations in the information,[7]
petitioner was charged for violating the first paragraph of BP 22. The elements
of the offense are:
1.
the making, drawing and issuance of
any check to apply to account or for value;
2.
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and
3.
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.[8]
All these elements are present in
this case.
Both
the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner issued BPI check no.
163255 postdated August 4, 1991 in the amount of P150,000 in
consideration of a loan which he obtained from Cenizal.
When the check was deposited, it was dishonored by the drawee
bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. There was sufficient evidence on record that
petitioner knew of the insufficiency of his funds in the drawee
bank at the time of the issuance of the check. In fact, this was why, on maturity
date, he requested the payee not to encash it with
the promise that he would replace it with cash. He made this request and
assurance seven times but repeatedly failed to make good on his promises
despite the repeated accommodation granted him by the payee, Cenizal.
Notice of Dishonor to Petitioner
And Payment of the Obligation
The
trial court found that, contrary to petitioner’s claim, Cenizal’s
counsel had informed petitioner in writing of the check’s dishonor and demanded
payment of the value of the check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor
and demand for payment, petitioner still failed to pay the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the period of five banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor
within which to pay the amount of the check.[9]
While petitioner may have been given only three days to pay the value of
the check, the trial court found that the amount due thereon remained unpaid
even after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of dishonor. This negated
his claim that he had already paid Cenizal and should
therefore be relieved of any liability.
Moreover, petitioner’s claim of
payment was nothing more than a mere allegation. He presented no proof to
support it. If indeed there was payment, petitioner should have redeemed or
taken the check back in the ordinary course of business.[10]
Instead, the check remained in the possession of the payee who demanded the
satisfaction of petitioner’s obligation when the check became due as well as
when the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to
petitioner and nonpayment of the obligation) were confirmed by the appellate
court. This Court has no reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule
that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are not to be disturbed.[11]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The April 28, 1999 decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 17-24.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Marina L. Buzon of the Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, p. 26.
[3] CA decision, rollo, pp. 17-24.
[4] G.R. No. 117857, 02 February 2001, 351 SCRA 100.
[5] Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, Seventh Revised Edition, 1995, p. 555.
[6] Tan
v. Mendez, Jr., 432 Phil. 760 (2002).
[7] The information read:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR. of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of JOSEFINO CENIZAL a
check no. 163255 drawn against the Bank of the Philippine Island[,] a duly
established domestic banking institution[,] in the amount in the amount of P150,000.00
Philippine Currency, postdated August 4, 1991, in payment of an obligation,
knowing fully well at the time of issue that [he] did not have the payment of
such check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for payment, the
same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof, accused Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr., did not
have sufficient funds therein, and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused
failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem or make good said
check, to the damage and prejudice of the said Josefino
Cenizal in the amount aforementioned and in such
other amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 17-18.)
[8] Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 187 (1998).
[9] Section 2 of BP 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. ― The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
[10] Tan v. Mendez, Jr., supra; Lim v. People, 420 Phil. 506 (2001).
[11] Miranda v. Besa, G.R. No. 146513, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 532.